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Abstract
In a highly interconnected world where new technology
emerges daily to improve our lives, important privacy implications
remain unsettled – what happens to the various types of data
collected by entities? What privacy rights do we have to that data?
What happens when our employer wants to collect that data from
us? In 2008, Illinois enacted this country’s first Biometric Privacy
Act (“BIPA”) to answer some of these emerging questions. This
statute has not been amended since 2008, despite various efforts,
and remained unnoticed until an influx of litigation arose in 2017.
This comment surveys Illinois’ BIPA, which is the most stringent
Biometric Privacy statute in the United States. It focuses on the

73

74

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:Article1stPg

impact BIPA has on employees and employers that largely use
biometric collection technology to improve their businesses.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Would you sacrifice your privacy to allow law enforcement to
catch a serial killer? That is precisely what a user of a genealogy
website, GEDmatch, facilitated for the Sacramento County police.1
After forty years, police matched the DNA of the infamous “Golden
State Killer” to DNA provided by his distant relative on
GEDmatch.2 This achievement shows the positive aspect of
technological advancement and how biometric data collection can
improve our daily lives; it can even solve a cold case. However, the
ability to collect biometric data raises the issue of data privacy,
which is an unsettled legal area largely governed by state laws, as
no federal regulation exists.3
Illinois passed the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA)
in 2008 to regulate businesses that wanted to use rapidly improving
technology to collect consumers’ biometric data such as
fingerprints.4 BIPA regulates private entities that collect biometric
data from individuals, but it does not apply to government entities.5
It imposes strict requirements for the collection, sharing, retention,
and destruction of such data.6 The statute went relatively unnoticed
until 2017, when a large number of plaintiffs began filing lawsuits
against companies for violating BIPA’s requirements.7
When litigation first arose, plaintiffs typically alleged that the
defendants violated BIPA by failing to give plaintiffs notice of the
data collection or obtain consent prior to collecting the data.8
* JD, UIC John Marshall School, 2020. Many thanks to my sister Rebecca
Bryant, who both paved the path of excellence as an advocate, and continues to
walk beside me, inspiring me to achieve goals that once seemed impossible.
1. Sarah Zhang, How a Genealogy Website Led to the Alleged Golden State
Killer, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2018), www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2018/04/golden-state-killer-east-area-rapist-dna-genealogy/559070/.
2. Id.
3. Michelle Gillette & Josh Thomas Foust, Genetic Testing Cos. Must
Examine Illinois Privacy Law, LAW360 (Aug. 3, 2018), www.law360.com/
articles/1069206/genetic-testing-cos-must-examine-illinois-privacy-law.
4. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1-99 (2008).
5. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2020).
6. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2020) (requiring private collect biometric data
to comply with strict requirements as it relates to the collection, storage, and
destruction of data. Otherwise, the entities face a set amount of damages per
each violation).
7. Stephanie Sheridan & Megan Brooks, Avoid Getting A Plaintiff's
Fingerprint Pointed At You, LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2018), www.law360.com/
articles/1015719/avoid-getting-a-plaintiff-s-fingerprint-pointed-at-you.
8. Alan S. Wernick, Biometric Information – Permanent Personally
Identifiable Information Risk, AM. BAR ASS’N (July 2, 2019),
www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletter

2020]

Biometric Privacy

75

Defendants typically responded to BIPA suits by arguing that
plaintiffs lacked standing because plaintiffs had not suffered an
injury, as required by Article III of the United States Constitution.9
BIPA lawsuits originally combated internet giants like Facebook
and Google, which allegedly violated BIPA’s notice and consent
requirements.10 However, in 2018, employees increasingly filed
lawsuits against their employers, particularly those that forced
employees to clock-in and clock-out of their work hours using their
fingerprints instead of the traditional method of stamping a
timecard physically or electronically.11
Until 2019, over thirty class action lawsuits had been filed
under BIPA, which was considered an influx in litigation.12
However, the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenbach v. Six
Flags13 opened the floodgates for litigation as BIPA lawsuits filed
in Illinois courts have risen to the hundreds since that decision.14 In
Rosenbach, the Illinois Supreme Court held that “an individual
need not allege some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond
violation of his or her rights under [BIPA], in order to qualify as an
‘aggrieved’ person and be entitled to seek liquidated damages and
injunctive relief pursuant to the Act.”15
Illinois remains among the most stringent states in biometric
privacy protections.16 Only Washington and Texas have enacted
similar statutes.17 Despite the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in
Rosenbach, there is still a split among federal district and circuit
courts as to whether an individual claiming a technical violation of
a statutory provision within BIPA satisfies Article III Standing
under the U.S. Constitution.18 This comment will focus on BIPA
s/bcl/2019/201902/fa_8/.
9. See e.g., Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(arguing that “collection of biometric information without notice or consent can
never support Article III Standing without ‘real-world harms’ such as adverse
employment impacts or even just ‘anxiety.’”).
10. Sheridan & Brooks, supra note 7.
11. Id.
12. Id. See e.g., In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 81044, at *14 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) (articulating the common
argument among plaintiffs that the business entity violated BIPA by failing to
obtain consent, prior to collecting biometric information, in the argument that
Facebook violated BIPA through its “Tag Suggestion” and did not obtain prior
consent to using a user’s facial recognition).
13. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm't Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207 (Ill. 2019).
14. Michael J. Bologna, Law on Hiring Robots Could Trigger Litigation for
Employers, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 11, 2019), news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/law-on-hiring-robots-could-trigger-litigation-for-employers.
15. Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1207.
16. Id.
17. Id.; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE (ARCW)
§ 19.375.020 (2017).
18. Compare Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir.
2019), cert. denied, No. 19-706, 2020 WL 283288 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2020) (holding
that “plaintiffs have alleged a concrete injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article
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standing and its impact on employers.
The background section will explore BIPA, differing views on
the required standing under the statute, similar statutes in other
states, and highlight how employers use biometric data. The
analysis section will analyze the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Article III Standing, compare biometric data
privacy statutes, highlight the potential future of BIPA, and
alternative protections for employees who refuse to disseminate
their biometric information. Finally, this Comment proposes that
current biometric privacy statutes should be amended to allow a
private right of action. Beyond that, other states need to continue to
enact these statutes. The courts need to support these efforts and
the legislatures’ intent by recognizing Article III Standing where an
entity has violated any provision of a biometric privacy statute.

II. BACKGROUND
The background section will explore the provisions and
requirements in BIPA, the Article III Standing associated with
interpreting BIPA, the statutes similar to BIPA in other states, and
the reasons employers give for collecting biometric data from
employees.

A. BIPA: Illinois’ First Step to Protect Data Privacy
Illinois passed BIPA in response to emerging public concern
over technologies that could attach biometric identifiers to financial
and personal information.19 The Illinois legislature declared that
personal biometric information is “biologically unique to the
individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual has no
recourse.”20 Specifically, there was concern over “finger-scanning
technologies” as a new form of payment method.21 At the time, many
corporations chose Chicago as a testing city for implementing
finger-scan technologies in public places, such as gas stations and
grocery stores.22
In 2008, shortly before BIPA was enacted, a company called
“Pay by Touch,” which intended to link consumers’ fingerprints to

III standing,” where the defendant failed to obtain written consent prior to its
collection, use, and storage of biometric identifiers), with Santana v. Take-Two
Interactive Software, Inc., 717 Fed. App’x 12, 15-18 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that
a technical violation of the consent provision in BIPA is sufficient to confer
Article III Standing).
19. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (d) (2020).
20. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (c) (2020) (contrasting biometric data with
finances and “other sensitive information,” like social security numbers).
21. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (a) (2020).
22. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (b)(2020).
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their bank accounts, went out of business.23 In using Pay by Touch,
a consumer could have used their fingerprint rather a credit card to
make purchases in-store.24 The failure of Pay by Touch, and its
ultimate bankruptcy filing, caused the Illinois legislature to
question the impact on collected sensitive information if a company
like Pay by Touch went out of business.25 The legislature was
concerned that data might be sold to third parties or shared in
bankruptcy proceedings, so customers needed protection.26 Thus,
the Illinois legislature passed BIPA and outlined its intent in doing
so: “The public welfare, security, and safety will be served by
regulating the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage,
retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and
information.”27
BIPA regulates the disclosure, collection, retention, and
destruction of biometric identifiers by any private entity.28 It does
not regulate state or local governments.29 A “biometric identifier”
covered under the act includes “retina or iris scan, fingerprint,
voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.”30 The term “biometric
identifier” does not include “writing samples, written signatures,
photographs, human biological samples used for valid scientific
testing or screening, demographic data, tattoo descriptions, or
physical descriptions such as height, weight, hair color, or eye
color.”31 The key BIPA provisions include: (1) obtaining written
consent from the individual prior to collecting data; (2) a time limit
for storing the data; (3) developing and maintaining a publicly
available retention schedule; (4) requiring the entity to protect the
data using reasonable care;32 (5) creating a private cause of action
23. Matt Marshall, Pay By Touch In Trouble, Founder Filing For
Bankruptcy, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 12, 2007), venturebeat.com/2007/11/12/payby-touch-in-trouble-founder-filing-for-bankruptcy/; Erica Gunderson, Biometric
Data: Are We Safer in Illinois, Or Just Having Less Fun?, CHI. TONIGHT (Jan.
22, 2018), chicagotonight.wttw.com/2018/01/22/biometric-data-are-we-saferillinois-or-just-having-less-fun.
24. Id.
25. Chris Hoffman, Seventh Circuit Suggests That Unions Can Negotiate
Workers’ Biometric Data Privacy Rights With Employers, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug.
14, 2019), www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee
_newsletters/cyberspace/2019/201908/unions/.
26. Cf. Darcy Reddan, Kroger Unit Fired Contaminated-Test Whistleblower,
Suit Says, LAW360 (June 13, 2017), www.law360.com/articles/933696/krogerunit-fired-contaminated-test-whistleblower-suit-says (noting that Pay by Touch
filed for bankruptcy and that, as a result of the filing, it became clear that
sensitive information was going to be sold, distributed, or shared in the
proceedings).
27. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (g) (2020).
28. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2020).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. The reasonable care requirement leads to the question, “what happens
when an employer declares bankruptcy or merges with another company?”
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for individuals; and (6) allowing individuals to recover liquidated
damages depending on the level of intent or to prove higher
damages.33
As applied to the context of employers, an employee must give
written consent or release34 to the employer before the employer can
collect, capture, purchase, or receive an employee’s “biometric
identifier.”35 BIPA also requires that destruction of an employee’s
biometric data occur either when the reason for collection no longer
exists or within three years of the employee’s last interaction with
the employer.36 An employer, or any other private entity that
possesses biometric data, must use the “reasonable standard of care
within the private entity’s industry” to store, transmit, and protect
the data.37 That is, an employer must exercise care that is the same
as or more protective than the care it uses to handle other
confidential and sensitive information.38 An employer cannot sell,
lease, trade, or otherwise use an employee’s biometric data for
profit.39 There is no exception in the statutory language of BIPA to
the prohibition on selling data, such as consent.
Many employers fear a high monetary judgment against them
in a potential BIPA lawsuit due to the liquidated damages that can
accumulate for each violation, which applies per person.40 For
example, in the recently settled BIPA lawsuit against Facebook, it
was estimated that the social media giant could have faced a $35
billion judgment due to its BIPA violations.41 Facebook ultimately
Becky Yerak, Mariano's, Kimpton Hotels Sued Over Alleged Collection Of
Biometric Data: 'It's Something Very Personal', CHI. TRIB. (July 21, 2017),
www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-employers-biometrics-lawsuits-0723-biz20170720-story.html.
33. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2020); John G. Browning, Department:
Technology: The Battle Over Biometrics, 81 TEX. B. J. 674 (2018).
34. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2020). “Written release means informed
written consent or, in the context of employment, a release executed by an
employee as a condition of employment.” Id.
35. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2020). “A private entity in possession of
biometric identifiers or biometric information must develop a written policy,
made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines
for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information
when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or
information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual's last
interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first.” Id.
36. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (e)(1) (2020).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(c) (2020); Alastair Johnson, Fighting
Biometric Fraud On The Blockchain, LAW.COM (Oct. 26, 2018), www.law.com/
legaltechnews/2018/10/26/fighting-biometric-fraud-on-the-blockchain/.
40. Susan Lorenc, Jim Shreve, & Ryan Gehbauer, BIPA Litigation Offers No
Legislative Reprieve To Employers – Yet, THOMPSON COBURN LLP (June 10,
2019), www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/cybersecurity-bits-and-bytes/
post/2019-06-10/bipa-litigation-offers-no-legislative-reprieve-to-employers-yet.
41. Devin Coldewey, Facebook Will Pay $550 Million to Settle Class Action
Lawsuit Over Privacy Violations, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 29, 2020),
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settled the lawsuit by agreeing to pay $550 million to the class of
BIPA plaintiffs, which includes up to seven million Facebook
users.42 Under BIPA, a prevailing party may recover liquidated
damages or actual damages, whichever is greater.43 Liquidated
damages include recovery of $1,000 for each negligent violation or
$5,000 for each intentional or reckless violation.44 Reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs may be recoverable, as well.45 Additionally,
a state or federal court may order an injunction to prevent an
employer or entity from collecting any further data from the
employee seeking redress.46

B. Who Is An “Aggrieved Person?” - Article III Standing
Prior to the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenbach, the
main controversy surrounding BIPA had been the interpretation of
the meaning of the term “aggrieved person” under the statute, and
whether Article III Standing under the U.S. Constitution is
satisfied.47 In considering Article III Standing under BIPA, this
section will highlight the following: the historical interpretation of
Article III Standing; Illinois’ interpretation of the term “aggrieved”
under BIPA; Article III Standing in the Federal District Courts of
Illinois; Article III Standing in the Federal District and Circuit
Courts of California; Article III Standing in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals; and the Dormant Commerce Clause.
1. Historical Interpretation of Article III Standing
As a general concept, the U.S. Supreme Court has long held
that Article III Standing requires that a plaintiff suffer an injury to
a legally protected interest that is casually connected to the
defendant’s conduct, and such injury will be redressed by a court’s
www.techcrunch. com/2020/01/29/facebook-will-pay-550-million-to-settle-classaction-lawsuit-over-privacy-violations/; Nicholas Iovino, Ninth Circuit
Advances $35 Billion Privacy Suit Against Facebook, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV.
(Aug. 9, 2019), www.courthousenews.com/ninth-circuit-advances-35-billionprivacy-suit-against-facebook/.
42. Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Facebook to Pay $550 Million to Settle
Facial Recognition Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), www.nytimes.com/
2020/01/29/technology/facebook-privacy-lawsuit-earnings.html.
43. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2020).
44. Id. For example, in applying the threshold for each violation, a small
employer with 100 employees that fails to comply with BIPA could be liable for
a $100,000-500,000 verdict if the employer fails to obtain consent prior to data
collection. Conversely, a large employer with 10,000 employees could be liable
for a verdict of $10-50 million for the same type of violation if it applied to the
employer’s interactions with all of its employees.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Sheridan & Brooks, supra note 7.
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decision.48 Federal courts only have jurisdiction over actual cases
and controversies, so standing is essential for a plaintiff to be heard
in federal court.49 The U.S. Supreme Court has not interpreted
standing as applied to Illinois’ BIPA statute or any other state
biometric privacy statute. Nor has Congress passed any laws
regulating the collection of biometric data.
The Article III Standing debate under BIPA has centered on
federal district, federal appellate, and Illinois state courts’
interpretations of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. In Spokeo, the Court reiterated that a
plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an “injury-in-fact” which
is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct.50 The Court has long
held that an injury “must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable
decision.’”51
Under the first element of injury-in-fact framework, the injury
must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.52 The
Court noted that Congress has the power to define what constitutes
an “injury,” but Article III Standing requires a concrete injury for
statutory violations, as well.53 The injury must be “actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” but the injury does not
need to be “tangible.”54 However, the existence of a statutory right
on its face does not necessarily qualify a procedural violation as a
concrete injury.55

48. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-741 (1972).
49. Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1542-48 (2016) (holding that the
appellate court failed in analyzing standing for suit brought under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970, because it did not distinguish between
“concreteness and particularization,” where Plaintiff alleged that a consumer
reporting agency generated inaccurate information for his Spokeo profile).
50. Id. at 1547.
51. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. The Court held that plaintiff wildlife
organizations lacked standing because they failed to show causation of their
injury and failed to show redressability. Id. The Court reiterated that there are
three pongs to Article III Standing that must be satisfied. Id.
52. Spokeo Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
53. Id. at 1549.
54. Id. at 1548. Despite the Court’s holding in Spokeo, it did not determine
the ultimate issue as to whether the plaintiff actually had Article III Standing.
Id. at 1550. Rather, the Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals fully address standing but analyzing “distinction between concreteness
and particularization.” Id.
55. Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 727 (7th Cir.
2016). The court held that that plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury for a
violation under 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681c(g)(1) of the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act. Id. Even though the restaurant printed his credit expiration
date on his receipt in violation of 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681c(g)(1), the violation did not
create an “appreciable risk of harm” or identity theft because no other person
saw the receipt. Id.
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2. Illinois’ Interpretation Of “Aggrieved” Under BIPA
In regards to BIPA and standing, Illinois allows a private right
of action from an individual or class of individuals.56 The Illinois
Attorney General may also enforce the statute, but litigation so far
has been limited to class actions suits where the damages are much
higher due to the stacking of a large number of plaintiffs.57 BIPA
states, “[a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have
a right of action.”58 However, Illinois state, federal district, and
federal appellate courts have grappled with determining whether
the word “aggrieved” means even a “technical violation,” such as a
notice violation, is actionable.59 In BIPA lawsuits, plaintiffs
typically allege in their complaint that an entity violated the BIPA
provisions requiring notice and consent.60 Typically, defendants
respond to the suit by filing a motion to dismiss and arguing the
plaintiffs lack standing for failure to allege an actual injury
resulting from such violation.61 The statute does not explicitly
define “aggrieved” in its definition section, so courts have discretion
to interpret the term.62
The Illinois Appellate Court’s 2017 ruling in Rosenbach v. Six
Flags Entertainment Corp. initially made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss, before the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled on standing under BIPA in 2019.63 In Rosenbach, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant-corporation violated BIPA’s
notice and consent requirement by collecting her son’s thumbprint
when he purchased a season pass at the theme park, without first
obtaining his parent’s written consent.64 The plaintiff alleged “she
would have never purchased a season pass for her son” had she
known the defendant was going to collect the data.65 The Illinois
Appellate Court held that the plaintiff in Rosenbach failed to allege
that she suffered an actual harm outside of the defendant violating
a BIPA provision.66 Therefore, the plaintiff did not meet the
requirement of “aggrieved” as outlined by BIPA and could not
56. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2020).
57. Sheridan & Brooks, supra note 7.
58. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2020).
59. Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, at ¶ 22.
60. Id.
61. Id. at ¶ 10.
62. Id. at ¶ 4.
63. Jeffrey D. Neuburger, Illinois Appellate Court Reinstates Biometric
Privacy Action, Finding Potential Harm In Alleged Disclosure Of Fingerprint To
Outside Vendor, NAT. L. REV. (Oct. 16, 2018), www.natlawreview.com/
article/illinois-appellate-court-reinstates-biometric-privacy-action-findingpotential-harm.
64. Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317 at ¶ 10.
65. Id. at ¶ 28.
66. Id.
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recover or receive liquidated damages based on the alleged technical
violation.67
The Illinois Appellate Court’s opinion in Rosenbach hinged
upon the interpretation of the word “aggrieved.”68 The court
declared that if every technical violation was actionable, the
requirement that a person be “aggrieved by a violation of the Act”
would effectively “render the word ‘aggrieved’ superfluous.”69 The
court also noted that it was appropriate to assign the meaning of an
undefined term in a statute using Black’s Law Dictionary.70 It found
that the definition of “aggrieved” presupposed an actual harm or
adverse effect.71 It declared that, “if the Illinois legislature intended
to allow for a private cause of action for every technical violation of
the Act, it could have omitted the word ‘aggrieved’ and stated that
every violation was actionable.”72 Thus, a plaintiff who alleges a
technical violation must also allege some tangible or intangible
adverse effect.73
On May 30, 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court granted the
plaintiff’s petition for leave of appeal.74 The court issued its opinion
on January 25, 2019, which reversed the lower court’s opinion.75 The
Illinois Supreme Court described the defendant’s position as
“untenable” with the legislature’s intent in enacting BIPA.76 It
quoted century-old precedent to find that “aggrieved simply ‘means
having a substantial grievance; a denial of some personal or
property right.’”77 The court presumed that the legislature
understood this precedent in enacting BIPA, and, therefore,
“aggrieved” means that a legal right was adversely affected.78
Further, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the General
Assembly created a legal right when it “codified that individuals
possess a right to privacy in and control over their biometric
identifiers and biometric information.”79 A “violation constitutes an
invasion, impairment, or denial of the statutory rights of any person
or customer whose biometric identifier or biometric information is
subject to the breach.”80 As such, no additional harm needs to be
67. Id. Cf Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 115 N.E.3d 1080 (Ill.
App. 1st 2018), appeal denied, 119 N.E.3d 1034 (Ill. 2019) (holding that the
plaintiff was not required to show an additional beyond a technical violation of
BIPA).
68. Neuburger, supra note 63.
69. Rosenbach, 2017 IL App (2d) 170317, at ¶ 23.
70. Id. at ¶ 20.
71. Id.
72. Id. at ¶ 23.
73. Id. at ¶ 28.
74. Neuburger, supra note 63.
75. Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1207.
76. Id. at 1204.
77. Id. at 1205 (quoting Glos v. People, 102 N.E. 763 (Ill. 1913)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1206.
80. Id.
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plead or proven by the plaintiff.81 If an entity does not comply with
Section 15 of BIPA (retention, collection, disclosure, destruction),
then the entity has committed a violation, thus entitling a plaintiff
to recovery, as Article III Standing has been met.82
3. Article III Standing in the Federal District Courts of
Illinois
A number of employees have collectively sued their employers
in class action suits, often in the Federal District Courts of Illinois.83
In 2017 and 2018, there were twelve BIPA cases in Illinois filed
against employers.84 The District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois first weighed in on Article III Standing in the BIPA context
in 2018.85 A federal court has an independent obligation to
determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim.86
“[S]tate law cannot create Article III Standing where none exists
under [] federal precedents.”87 In Johnson v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
an employee sued United Airlines because the airline required
fingerprint scans as an employment condition, but failed to obtain
the employee’s consent prior to collection.88 The court dismissed the
claim because a collective bargaining agreement preempted the
court from hearing the claim.89 However, the court felt obligated to
address the employee’s lack of standing in its opinion.90 It reiterated
that BIPA was enacted “to protect ‘[t]he public welfare, security,
and safety.’”91 A consent violation did not prove there was risk of
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Sheridan & Brooks, supra note 7.
84. Vigil v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 499 (S.D.
N.Y. Jan. 27, 2017); Barnes v. ARYZTA, LLC, 288 F. Supp. 3d 834 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
20, 2017); Kiefer v. Bob Evans Farms, LLC, 313 F. Supp. 3d 966 (N.D. Ill. May
23, 2018); Dixon v. Washington & Jane Smith Cmty., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90344 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018); Howe v. Speedway LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90342 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018); Goings v. UGN, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99273 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2018); Johnson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 127959 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2018); Aguilar v. Rexnord LLC, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 110765 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2018); Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co.,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143369 (N.D. Ill. August 23, 2018); White vs. Hegewisch
Development Corp., 2018 WL 3772630, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2018); Bryant v. Loews
Chicago Hotel Inc. et al., 2018 WL 3712874, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2018).
85. Johnson v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 17 C 08858 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
127959, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2018).
86. Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1998).
87. Patel, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 952–53 (highlighting that federal courts require
Article III Standing regardless of whether a state court has found standing on
the same issue).
88. Johnson, No. 17 C 08858 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127959, at *3.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *10.
91. Id. at *11 (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(g) (2020)) (alteration in
original).
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disclosure, so plaintiff needed to establish an actual injury based on
“subsequent disclosure.”92
In 2018, the Northern District of Illinois clarified whether
there is standing when biometric data is shared with a third party
in the case Dixon v. Washington & Jane Smith Cmty.93 An employer,
Smith Senior Living, disclosed an employee’s fingerprint
information to a third party—out-of-state vendor Kronos, which
supplied fingerprint scanners the employer used for biometric
timekeeping.94 In contrast to previous cases that failed to allege a
concrete injury, the employee in Dixon showed an actual harm,
according to the court.95 The court found that the employee met the
standing requirement because the employer did, in fact, “disclose”
the biometric information to a third party vendor without the
employee’s consent, which resulted in an injury.96 Specifically, the
court clarified the employee met Article III Standing because her
privacy injury was “fairly traceable to the BIPA violations alleged,
and it may be redressed by at least some of the relief that [Plaintiff]
seeks.”97 The holding in Dixon opened the door to a large area of
liability for large employers that use a third party to maintain their
employee’s biometric timecards.98
The court in Dixon also noted the employer’s defense—that the
employee alleged “a bare procedural violation of BIPA”—was
synonymous with attacking Article III Standing.99 The employer
argued that it did not trigger the burden to show Article III
Standing because neither party challenged subject matter
jurisdiction.100 The court rejected this argument because the
employer used authority that directly challenged Article III.101
Similar to the defendant in Dixon, in Roberts v. Dart Container
Corp. of Illinois, the defendants removed the case to federal court
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act,102 and then argued the

92. Id. at *11-12.
93. Dixon v. Washington & Jane Smith Cmty., No. 17 C 8033, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 90344, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018) (discussing an employee that
sued its employer by alleging the employer violated their privacy rights under
BIPA for disclosing biometric data to a third party, Kronos, which is a company
that handles timekeeping for employers without the employer or Kronos
obtaining written consent for the data).
94. Id. at *2-3.
95. Id. at *30.
96. Id. at *39.
97. Id. at *33.
98. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2020) (noting that a private entity
cannot profit from a person’s biometric data collection).
99. Dixon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90344, at *10.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *12 (citing Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d at 1108, 1112-18 (9th
Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Spokeo II]; Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d
909, 911-13 (7th Cir. 2017); Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16 C10984, 2017 WL
4099846, at *8 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017); Vigil, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 507-19).
102. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), 28 USC 1711,
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plaintiff did not have standing.103 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that a defendant undoubtedly triggers the burden to
show federal jurisdiction when the defendant removes a case to
federal court, regardless of other considerations.104
4. Article III Standing in the Federal Courts of California
Similar to the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in Rosenbach,
the Ninth Circuit became the first federal circuit to hold that a
plaintiff who alleges a technical violation under BIPA has Article
III Standing in Patel v. Facebook, Inc.105 Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Patel, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California addressed standing under BIPA and found that a
technical violation satisfied standing because it is a concrete
harm.106 There, a Facebook user alleged that Facebook’s “tag
suggestions” program violated BIPA’s notice and consent
provision.107 Facebook used software designed to match the faces of
people in photos with the names of the Facebook users in the photos,
thereby harvesting biometric data from millions of users without
gaining prior consent.108 The court held that BIPA does not require
additional proof of an actual harm or financial loss because the
privacy right violation is sufficient.109 Additionally, it rejected the
defendant’s argument that BIPA only regulates “live” facial
geometry scans, rather than photographs, such that photographic
information from facial recognition software is excluded from

states:
(b) In General. -- A class action may be removed to a district court of the
United States in accordance with section 1446 (except that the 1-year
limitation under section 1446(b) shall not apply), without regard to
whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is
brought, except that such action may be removed by any defendant
without the consent of all defendants. (c) Review of Remand Orders.-- (1)
In general.-- Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under this
section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals
may accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or
denying a motion to remand a class action to the State court from which
it was removed if application is made to the court of appeals not less than
7 days after entry of the order.
103. Roberts v. Dart Container Corp. of Illinois, No. 17 C 9295, 2018 WL
3015793, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2018).
104. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
105. Patel, 932 F.3d at 1274; Michael E. Brewer, William F. Dugan & Jenna
Neumann, The Ninth Circuit Clears The Way For BIPA Class Actions, BAKER &
MCKENZIE LLP (Aug. 13, 2019), www.theemployerreport.com/2019/08/theninth-circuit-clears-the-way-for-bipa-class-actions/.
106. In re Facebook, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81044, at *5.
107. Id. at *3.
108. Singer & Isaac, supra note 42.
109. In re Facebook, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81044, at *5.
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BIPA’s protections.110
In the preceding class certification order, the Northern District
of California Court reached its holding by interpreting the Illinois
Appellate Court’s finding in Rosenbach, BIPA’s plain language, and
the legislative intent behind the Act.111 The court determined that,
had the plaintiff in Rosenbach alleged a privacy right violation in
her complaint instead of a BIPA notice and consent violation, then
she would have standing.112 Accordingly, the court determined that
the holding in Rosenbach meant that a privacy right injury qualified
as an injury, for standing purposes.113 Even if “Rosenbach might be
read differently, the [c]ourt would part company with it” because
Illinois law is not binding on California.114 This commentary
demonstrates that, while the Illinois Supreme Court has weighed
in on standing, federal courts still require Article III Standing,
therefore federal courts can still weigh in on the standing issue.
The Northern District of California Court concluded a BIPA
notice and consent violation was the exact harm that the legislature
intended to prevent.115 The Illinois legislature could have used
language in BIPA that required an “actual” injury, as it has in other
statutes, but it did not.116 The Northern District of California
pointed out that the Illinois Appellate Court in Rosenbach did not
address the Illinois Supreme Court’s precedent established in
Jones—even though it is still good law.117 In Jones, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a statutory “aggrieved” party includes “a
direct, immediate and substantial interest rather than a
speculative, theoretical, inconsequential or remote interest.”118
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals weighed in on
Article III Standing under BIPA in Patel.119 Relying on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the
Ninth Circuit concluded the U.S. Supreme Court viewed
technological advances as “increas[ing] the potential for

110. Id. at *15.
111. In re Facebook, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63930, at *19.
112. Id. at *18.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *19-20.
116. Id. at *20. See e.g., Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10a (2007) (stating that a private right
of action is limited to person who suffers "actual" damage).
117. In re Facebook, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63930, at *21 (pointing out,
“Rosenbach omits any discussion of Jones, and Facebook also does not address
it in its papers. That is a concern because Jones is good law in Illinois and is
actively cited today by other federal courts and Illinois state courts, significantly
in the BIPA context”).
118. Id. at *20 (quoting Am. Sur. Co. v. Jones, 51 N.E.2d 122, 126 (Ill. 1943)
(holding that aggrieved refers to a substantial personal or property interest is
violated) (internal quotations omitted).
119. Patel, 932 F.3d at 1268.
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unreasonable intrusions into personal privacy.”120 By concluding
that a biometric privacy right qualified as a closely-related
traditional harm recognized by courts, the Ninth Circuit pointed out
the consequences of Facebook’s “tag suggestions,” when it stated:
Once a face template of an individual is created, Facebook can use it
to identify that individual in any of the other hundreds of millions of
photos uploaded to Facebook each day, as well as determine when the
individual was present at a specific location. Facebook can also
identify the individual’s Facebook friends or acquaintances who are
present in the photo.121

The court found that developing a face template from facial
recognition technology “invades an individual's private affairs and
concrete interests.”122 For example, “a face-mapped individual could
be identified from a surveillance photo taken on the streets or in an
office building. Or a biometric face template could be used to unlock
the face recognition lock on that individual's cellphone.”123
Therefore, the court held that “plaintiffs have alleged a concrete
injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing” when they
prove that the defendant failed to obtain written consent, prior to
collecting, using, and storing biometric identifiers.124
Following the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to grant the defendant’s
motion to dismiss for lack of standing in Patel, and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s refusal to grant certiorari to review of the case,
Facebook settled with the plaintiffs for $550 million.125 Some have
heralded the settlement as landmark and record-breaking, while
others have pointed out that the settlement is dismal when
compared to Facebook’s potential liability of $35 billion.126 In
comparing the settlement and the potential liability, Facebook’s
settlement only amounted to slightly less than 1.5% of its liability
under BIPA, had the case proceeded to trial and a verdict was
entered against Facebook. The settlement is made more miniscule
by the fact that Facebook made over $70 billion in revenue in 2019,
largely from digital advertisements.127 Thus, a $550 million

120. Id. at 1273 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012); Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373, 386 (2014); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
121. Id.
122. Id. Privacy rights have long been actionable at common law and
“privacy torts do not always require additional consequences to be
actionable.” Id. at 1274 (quoting Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983
(9th Cir. 2017)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1274.
125. Kamran Salour & Melinda L. McLellan, Following SCOTUS Cert
Denial, Facebook Settles BIPA Case for $550 Million, BAKERHOSTETLER (Jan.
31,
2020),
www.dataprivacymonitor.com/biometrics/following-scotus-certdenial-facebook-settles-bipa-case-for-550-million/.
126. Coldewey, supra note 41.
127. J. Clement, Facebook: Annual Revenue 2009-2019, STATISTA (Feb. 3,
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settlement is miniscule in that regard.
5. Article III Standing in the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals
Other federal circuit courts have also weighed in on BIPA, and
these cases are actively cited by federal district courts. In Santana
v. Take-Two Interactive Software, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit came to the same conclusion as the Illinois Appellate
Court’s interpretation in Rosenbach, agreeing that a technical
violation did not satisfy standing without additional actual harm.128
In Santana, the court held that a plaintiff failed to show that
violating a provision of BIPA created a material risk of harm.129 It
also noted that a reasonable person would have been on notice that
defendant was collecting biometric data, due to the invasive nature
of the collection.130 Plaintiff’s fear of participating in other biometric
transactions did not qualify as an injury-in-fact.131 The Second
Circuit emphasized that the Illinois legislature already clarified
that a “consumers’ withdrawal from biometric-facilitated
transactions” only arises when data has been “collected or disclosed
without his or her authorization.”132 While the Santana opinion in
2017 predated the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in Rosenbach in
2019,133 that does not necessarily mean the outcome in Santana
would have differed, had it post-dated Rosenbach, because the
Second Circuit could have reached the same conclusion by relying
on the Dormant Commerce Clause.
6. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Defendants in at least two federal district court cases claimed
2020), www.statista.com/statistics/268604/annual-revenue-of-facebook/.
128. Santana, 717 Fed. App’x at 15-17. Video game users sued a company
that used their biometric data in a 3D mapping process to create an avatar. Id.
at 14. The game displayed the following terms and conditions: “Your face scan
will be visible to you and others you play with and may be recorded or screen
captured during gameplay.” Id. “By proceeding you agree and consent to such
uses and other uses pursuant to the End User License Agreement.
www.take2games.com/eula.” Id. The game would not proceed unless the users
clicked continue. Id. The players sued for failure to gain their written consent
prior to data collection under BIPA. Id. The court dismissed the claim because
the players failed to allege Article III Standing. Id. at 17-18.
129. Id. at 17.
130. Id. at 15-16.
131. Id. at 17.
132. Id.
133. Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1207 (holding “an individual need not allege
some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her rights under
the Act, in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ person and be entitled to seek
liquidated damages and injunctive relief pursuant to the Act.”).
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that subjecting out-of-state defendants to BIPA is a violation of the
Dormant Commerce Clause.134 The Dormant Commerce Clause
precludes a state from regulating or controlling economic activity,
when that activity is conducted solely outside of its border.135 In
BIPA cases, defendants have argued that subjecting them to BIPA
regulations violates the Dormant Commerce Clause because Illinois
would be attempting to unduly burden interstate commerce.136
Therefore, the defendants argue that it is unconstitutional for
Illinois to regulate out-of-state businesses’ collection of biometric
data.137 The Ninth Circuit has rejected defendants’ argument.138
The court reasoned the lawsuit was based on a violation of an
Illinois state statute, on behalf of Illinois residents, who used
Facebook in Illinois, and the economic activity occurred within
Illinois only.139 BIPA would not force Facebook to adjust its
practices in any other state, and Facebook could easily cease its
interaction with Illinois users.140

C. Biometric Privacy Protections in Other States
The above case analysis only covers the interpretation of
Illinois’ BIPA. Similar to most privacy laws in the United States,
biometric data protection is a patchwork of state law.141 Other
states are free to enact their own statutes. However, only a few
states have actually enacted biometric data privacy statutes.142
Illinois, Texas, and Washington are the only states that have passed
comprehensive statutes prohibiting entities from collecting
biometric data without a person’s prior consent.143 Additionally, the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)144 became effective on
134. In re Facebook, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81044, at *12; Monroy v.
Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16 C 10984 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017).
135. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989).
136. In re Facebook, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81044, at *13-14.
137. Id. at *13.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *14.
140. Id.
141. Sharon Roberg-Perez, The Future Is Now: Biometric Information And
Data Privacy, 31 ANTITRUST 60, 63 (2017); W. Gregory Voss & Kimberly A.
Houser, Personal Data And The Gdpr: Providing A Competitive Advantage For
U.S. Companies, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 287, 340 (2019).
142. The Biometric Bandwagon Rolls On: Biometric Legislation Proposed
Across The United States, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019),
www.natlawreview.com/article/biometric-bandwagon-rolls-biometriclegislation-proposed-across-united-states.
143. Sheridan & Brooks, supra note 7. Additionally, in California, the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) regulates how employers use
biometric data. The Latest on California’s Approach to Biometrics in the
Workplace, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 10, 2019), www. natlawreview.com/article/latestcalifornia-s-approach-to-biometrics-workplace.
144. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 1.81.5 CAL. CIV. CODE §
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January 1, 2020, and it regulates some biometric data collection,
but not to the same extent as BIPA.145
Texas became the second state to enact a biometric privacy law
in 2009.146 Texas defines a “biometric identifier” as “retina or iris
scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of hand or face geometry.”147
The Texas statute does not protect the broad umbrella of “biometric
information” that Illinois protects.148 Written authorization prior to
collection is not required, but notice and consent must be given.149
Any data collection under this statute’s protection must be
destroyed within a “reasonable time,” up to a year, after which the
data is no longer needed.150 The penalty is $25,000 per violation, but
only the attorney general may bring an action rather than an
individual or class.151
Washington passed its Biometric Privacy Law under HB 1493
on April 11, 2017, which became effective on July 23, 2017.152
Washington’s definition of “biometric identifier” includes “an
individual’s retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, DNA, or scan
of hand or face geometry.”153 It does not include photographs or
audio recordings.154 The Washington law does not regulate
employers that collect biometric data for timekeeping.155 The
employer exemption exists because the Washington statute only
applies to commercial collectors of biometric identifiers.156 A
“Commercial Purpose” is defined as “a purpose in furtherance of the
sale or disclosure to a third party of a biometric identifier for the
purpose of marketing goods or services when such goods or services
are unrelated to the initial transaction in which a person first gains
possession of an individual’s biometric identifier.”157 Additionally,
only the attorney general can sue to enforce the statute for a

1798.100 - 199. Due to the timing the CCPA’s enactment and effective date in
2020, it is not discussed at length in this comment.
145. Anthony Zaller, Employee Biometric Data Issues Under California Law,
CAL. EMP’T L. REP. (Feb. 7, 2020), www.californiaemploymentlawreport.com/
2020/02/employee-biometric-data-issues-under-california-law/.
146. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009).
147. Id.
148. See Browning, supra note 33, at 676 (clarifying that Texas’ statute does
not include the data that “is converted into a code or template” and stored based
upon a person’s actual fingerprint for example).
149. Id.
150. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(c)(3) (2020).
151. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001(d) (2020).
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2017).
153. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2020).
154. Id.
155. Annemaria Duran, Learn How Washington’s New Biometric Privacy
Law Affects Businesses, SWIPECLOCK WORKFORCE MGMT. (Jan. 3, 2018), www3.
swipeclock.com/blog/learn-washingtons-new-biometric-privacy-law-affectsbusinesses/.
156. Id.
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2020).
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violation.158
At least eight other states have attempted to pass biometric
privacy laws, but these attempts have failed.159 The proposed bills
in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York did not allow an
individual right of action.160 The states that have attempted to pass
or have biometric privacy bills pending, include: Alaska, Arizona,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Oregon, and Rhode Island.161
Some states that failed to pass comprehensive biometric data
privacy bills have been able to pass other statutory protections. For
example, in New York, the expansion of New York’s Stop Hacks and
Improve Electronic Data Security Act (SHIELD), which requires
notice if there is biometric information that has been accessed by an
unauthorized entity and requires safeguards for protecting
biometric information, became effective in February 2020.162
Similarly, Arkansas updated its data breach response law, which
requires individuals and businesses to maintain reasonable
measures to protect biometric data from unauthorized access and
disclosure.163 If biometric data is breached, then businesses and
individuals are required to disclose it to the Attorney General when
the breach affects more than 1,000 individuals and there is a
“reasonable likelihood of harm to consumers.”164

D. Employer Data Collection
An understanding of the volume of hourly employees in the
United States is crucial to appreciate the impact of BIPA for both
employers and employees. The Department of Labor estimated that
79.9 million hourly employees worked in the United States in
2016.165 Some employers are transitioning to the use of biometric
data collection to track employee timecards in lieu of identification
badges, which primarily affects hourly workers.166 Additionally,
158. Id.
159. Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric Privacy Law Lacks Teeth Of
Illinois Cousin, BLOOMBERG L. (July 18, 2017), www.bna.com/washingtonbiometric-privacy-n73014461920/.
160. Id.
161. Id.; State Biometric Privacy Legislation: What You Need to Know,
THOMPSON HINE LLP (Sept. 5, 2019), www.thompsonhine.com/publications/
state-biometric-privacy-legislation-what-you-need-to-know.
162. THOMPSON HINE LLP, supra note 148.
163. Consumer Protection Security Or Data Breach, ARK. ATT’Y GEN., www.
arkansasag.gov/consumer-protection/identity/column-one/security-or-databreach/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2020).
164. Id.
165. Characteristics Of Minimum Wage Workers, BLS (Apr. 2017), www.
bls.gov/opub/reports/minimum-wage/2016/home.htm.
166. Lauraann Wood, Ill. Lighting Co. Sued In Latest Biometric Privacy
Action, LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2018), www.law360.com/articles/1088059/ill-lighting-
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employers use biometrics to secure business areas or devices,
control access to information, trace employee trainings, and even
track employees’ attendance in wellness programs promoting
preventative health measures.167 Many employers also use
biometric collection to prevent timekeeping theft through “buddy
clocking” where an employee clocks in for another employee.168
Under BIPA, employers are required to publish a written plan of
collecting, storing, and safeguarding the information.169
Employee BIPA plaintiffs typically sue employers for violating
the informed consent requirement.170 For instance, ramp and
operations employees at Midway Airport in Chicago sued their
employer, Southwest Airlines (“Southwest”) in 2017 for violating
their “substantive privacy rights” under BIPA.171 In Miller v.
Southwest Airlines, after Southwest had implemented a fingerscanning biometric timekeeping system, which also assisted with
payroll, the system became the subject of plaintiffs’ suit.172 The
employees alleged that Southwest failed to comply with three BIPA
requirements: (1) provide notice about the timekeeping program; (2)
obtain written consent to collect data and transmit it to third
parties; and (3) publish data retention schedules.173 The employees
asserted they “would not have agreed to work for [Southwest]” at
their salaries, had they known Southwest was going to collect their
biometric data.174 The court agreed and found that Southwest owed
the employees additional compensation for taking the employees’
data without compensation.175 The employees requested
“compensation for the commercial value of their biometric
information.”176 Miller v. Southwest Airlines is a prime example of
how employers are utilizing biometric data and why employees are
suing employers.
Beyond timekeeping, there is another rising technology that
could be implicated by BIPA: artificial intelligence facial
analytics.177 Employers have begun to use “hiring robots” to
co-sued-in-latest-biometric-privacy-action.
167. Annemaria Duran, Understanding the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act & Its Relation to Employers, SWIPECLOCK WORKFORCE
MANAGEMENT (Dec. 27, 2017), www3.swipeclock.com/blog/understandingillinois-biometric-information-privacy-act-relation-employers/.
168. Hannah Meisel, United Airlines Latest To Be Sued Under Ill.
Biometrics Law, LAW360 (Nov. 8, 2017), www.law360.com/articles/
983384/united-airlines-latest-to-be-sued-under-ill-biometrics-law.
169. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.14/5 (2020).
170. Wood, supra note 148.
171. Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. 18 C 86, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
143369, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2018).
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *4, 15.
176. Id. at *15.
177. For a fuller discussion of this technology and Illinois’ attempt to
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interview applicants through pre-recorded videos submitted to the
employer by applicants.178 The robots “analyze facial expressions,
gestures, and word choice to evaluate qualities such as honesty,
reliability, and professionalism.”179 Some attorneys predict that this
technology will be subject to litigation under BIPA because
employers are using biometric facial data to analyze the
applicants.180 In this context, employers using interview robots
would need to gain consent from applicants prior to data collection,
in order to comply with BIPA.181

III. ANALYSIS
The main controversy surrounding BIPA has been what type
of injury a plaintiff must allege to have Article III Standing to sue
a private entity that collected or distributed a plaintiff’s biometric
data. This section will analyze Article III Standing then compare
various state biometric privacy statutes. This section will also
analyze the privacy impact on employees and potential for
retaliatory discharge. It will include the financial impact on
employers, statutory provisions in BIPA that have not been
addressed by Illinois courts and legislature, and areas wherein
BIPA claims could grow.

A. Interpreting Article III Standing
“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has noted that ‘both common law
and the literal understanding of privacy encompass the individual’s

regulate the notice aspect of it to applicants, see Gabrielle Neace, AIVIA: A Step
Towards Protecting Data Privacy Or A Continuation Of The Push For
Individuals To Trade Their Privacy Rights For Employment?, UIC J. MARSHALL
L. REV. (Feb. 20, 2020), lawreview.jmls.uic.edu/aivia-a-step-towards-protectingdata-privacy-or-a-continuation-of-the-push-for-individuals-to-trade-theirprivacy-rights-for-employment/.
178. Michael J. Bologna, Law On Hiring Robots Could Trigger Litigation
For Employers, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 11, 2019), news.bloomberglaw.com/dailylabor-report/law-on-hiring-robots-could-trigger-litigation-for-employers.
179. Id.
180. Erin Bolan Hines, Illinois Employers Using AI To Screen Applicants
Could Face Litigation, Bloomberg Reports, SHOOK, HARDY, & BACON LLP (Oct.
12,
2019),
www.shb.com/news/2019/10/hines-bolan-aivia-act-bloomberg;
Katherine P. Sandberg & Robert T. Quackenboss, Illinois Enacts AI Interview
Law Amid an International Trend Toward Regulation, HUNTON ANDREWS &
KURTH (Nov. 18, 2019), www.huntonlaborblog.com/2019/11/articles/legislativefederal-state-developments/illinois-enacts-ai-interview-law-amid-aninternational-trend-toward-regulation/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_
medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+HuntonEmploymentLaborLawPerspecti
ves+(Hunton+Employment+%26+Labor+Law+Perspectives)#page=1.
181. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2020).
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control of information concerning his or her person.’”182 Historically,
a personal privacy right qualifies as an intangible injury-in-fact
under Article III.183 Moreover, Illinois law has recognized a violation
of privacy rights as a valid tort claim for decades.184 In Spokeo, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that two additional considerations are
made when determining whether an “intangible” injury qualifies as
concrete harm.185 The first consideration is “whether an alleged
intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit.”186
The second is whether Congress has recognized the “legally
cognizable injuries [as] concrete.”187 However, the U.S. Supreme
Court has not been clear as to what intangible injuries qualify for
Article III Standing.188
Even though BIPA is not a federal statute, the Court never
distinguished state statutes as less important than federal ones.189
“[T]here is no good reason why the judgment of a state legislature
should be treated as less important than that of Congress in
deciding when the violation of a statutory grant in itself amounts to
a real and concrete injury.”190 The Illinois legislature’s recognition
of the injury should be considered in defining an intangible harm
just as a federal statute would be used.191 By enacting BIPA, the
Illinois legislature intended to protect a citizen’s right to control
their own biometric data, which suggests that any violation was
meant to be a cognizable injury.192 Further, remedies have long been
awarded to address “invasions of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion,
and nuisance[,]” all of which qualify as intangible injuries.193 In
considering the U.S. Supreme Court and Illinois Supreme Court’s
historical recognition of privacy rights as well as the Illinois
legislature’s intent in enacting BIPA, Article III Standing should be
182. Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2017)
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (holding that disclosing an FBI rap sheet to a third-party
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.”)).
183. Id.
184. Leopold v. Levin, 259 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ill. 1970); Lovgren v. Citizens
First Nat. Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 990 (Ill. 1989).
185. Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
186. Id. (emphasis added).
187. Id. (alteration added).
188. Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification To Identity Theft: Public
Perceptions Of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 UC IRVINE L. REV. 107, 143 (2019).
189. See Perlin v. Time Inc., 237 F. Supp. 3d 623, 639-42 (E.D. Mich. 2017)
(holding that a customer had standing because their information was disclosed
in a violation of Michigan's Video Rental Privacy Act).
190. Patel, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 953.
191. Id.
192. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2020).
193. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir.
2017) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(B)); Patel, 290 F. Supp. 3d at
954.
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satisfied when a plaintiff brings suit for a violation of BIPA in state
or federal court. A biometric data privacy interest is just as
important as other common law privacy interests.
It could be strategic for a BIPA defendant to remove the case
to federal court, but if a defendant removes a case, it may acquire
the burden to show the plaintiff had standing.194 The “party”
asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden to show that Article
III Standing existed at the time the suit was removed to federal
court.195 The Northern District of Illinois has noted that defendants
cannot argue in one motion that standing does not exist, then argue
for removal in another motion.196 A court may remand a case even
if the defendant only indirectly casts doubt on jurisdiction.197 The
Seventh Circuit has noted that courts should construe “the removal
statute198 narrowly, resolving any doubt in favor of the plaintiff's
choice of forum in state court.”199 Therefore, BIPA suits that begin
in state court will likely remain in state court because defendants’
central arguments have attacked standing.

B. Comparing Illinois’ BIPA with Other State Privacy
Statutes
BIPA is considered the strongest biometric privacy act among
the states because Illinois is the only state that allows an individual
to sue for a violation.200 Neither Texas nor Washington allow for a
“private right of action,” rather only the attorney general can
enforce a violation in those states.201 Aside from that distinction,
there are multiple similarities and differences between the statutes
in Illinois and Texas.202 Texas and Illinois both require employers
to use “reasonable care” to protect data; destroy data that is no
longer needed; give notice to the employee; and gain consent from

194. Collier v. SP Plus Corp., 889 F.3d 894, 895 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(remanding a case back to the district court to return it to state court because
it was unremovable due to plaintiff’s lack of standing).
195. Dixon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90344, at *10; Collier, 889 F.3d at 896.
196. Mocek v. Allsaints USA Ltd., 220 F. Supp. 3d 910, 914-15 (N.D. Ill.
2016).
197. Dixon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90344, at *6 (quoting Zhirovetskiy v. Zayo
Group, LLC, No. 17 C 5876, dkt. no. 49 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2018)) (holding that
the “the spirit” of defendant’s argument indirectly casted doubt on Article III
Standing so remand was granted).
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2018) (describing “if at any time before final judgment
it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall
be remanded.”).
199. Dixon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90344, at *3 (quoting Schur v. L.A.
Weight Loss Centers, Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009)).
200. Shukovsky, supra note 159.
201. Id.
202. Sheridan & Brooks, supra note 7.
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the employee.203
The Texas statute is only more stringent than Illinois in two
very limited areas: the time limit to destroy data is shorter and the
liquidated damages are higher.204 The possibility of a lawsuit is
much higher in a state where every private person can sue
compared to a state where only the attorney general can sue.205
Illinois is more stringent overall because it requires “written”
consent, rather than verbal consent.206 It also covers “biometric
information,”207 which is broader than Texas’ “biometric identifier”
categorization.208 Illinois does not specify the content or format of
the written release, so presumably the release could be obtained
electronically with a simple “accept” button, rather than a
signature.209 As the statute is silent, the courts may interpret this
meaning “[i]n light of the legislature's intent.”210

C. BIPA Statutory Interpretation, Failed Amendments,
and Potential Areas of Litigation
In looking to the language of BIPA itself, there are issues that
have not been addressed by the Illinois legislature or interpreted by
Illinois courts. As to statutory interpretation, the Illinois Supreme
Court has held that legislative intent from the language of a statute
is essential to its interpretation.211 The statute should be read as a
whole, including “its nature, its object and the consequences that
would result from construing it one way or the other.”212
Other Illinois employment statutes could help determine the
legislative intent surrounding BIPA and the form of the required
written consent.213 BIPA does mention that “[w]ritten release’

203. Browning, supra note 33, at 676.
204. See id. (explaining that under Texas statute, the company retaining
biometric data must destroy it within a year after the data is no longer needed.
Additionally, the liquidated damages in Texas are $25,000 per violation).
205. See id. (noting that only the attorney general can enforce the Texas
statute to recover damages or other remedies). See also United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, n. 11 (1982) (holding that the attorney general
retains broad discretion to determine which claims to prosecute).
206. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2020).
207. Browning, supra note 33, at 675 (describing that Texas does not include
data that “is converted into a code or template”).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See People v. Garcia, N.E.2d 32, 36 (Ill. 2011) (relying on legislative
intent to interpret a statute).
211. People v. Fort, 88 N.E.3d 718, 723-24 (Ill. 2017).
212. Fumarolo v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1302 (Ill. 1990).
213. Compare 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 with Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. ch. 18 § 1001, et seq. (1974)
(governing employee benefits and requiring that an employer generally cannot
force an employee to receive the “employee benefits plan” documents via
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means informed written consent or, in the context of employment, a
release executed by an employee as a condition of employment.”214
In looking to the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, the
statute specifies that the employer may obtain “written or electronic
consent” to disburse an employee’s wages via payroll card.215 In that
same statue, the employer cannot deduct funds from an employee’s
paycheck unless the employer obtains “express written consent of
the employee, given freely at the time the deduction is made.”216
Therefore, BIPA may require paper form, as legislators could have
easily specified the form, as shown through the Wage Payment and
Collection Act .217
BIPA does not contain a defined statute of limitations, so BIPA
may be subject to different interpretations, based upon other Illinois
statutes.218 For example, if biometric privacy rights fall under the
same privacy rights like slander or libel, then the limitation would
be one year from the date of the injury or violation.219 That rationale
was applied to the Illinois Right to Privacy Act, which does not have
a limitation period, but Illinois courts have interpreted it to have a
one-year limitation.220 On the other hand, BIPA violation could have
a three-year limitation if a claim is categorized as a negligence claim
considering one of the categories of damages is based upon a
“negligent violation.”221 This rationale has merit because BIPA
imposes a reasonable duty of care, which is the crux of a negligence
claim.222 If neither the one- nor three-year limitation apply, BIPA
could also fall under the general five year limitation for civil actions

electronic delivery unless the employer meets certain requirements). See also
When Can Employers Use Electronic Delivery of Benefit Plan Documents, EMP.
BENEFITS
CORP.
(Sep.
21,
2016),
www.ebcflex.com/
Education/ComplianceBuzz/tabid/1140/ArticleID/377/When-Can-EmployersUse-Electronic-Delivery-of-Benefit-Plan-Documents.aspx; Disclosure, 29 CFR
2520.104b-1 (2002). The employee must have regular access to a computer
provided by the employer that is not a central computer or kiosk. Id. There is
an exception if the employee provides an email to receive electronic notification
and completes an electronic consent form. Id. Similar to an employee benefits
plan, biometric data contains sensitive information important to an individual’s
livelihood. Id. Therefore, in considering how employee benefits plans are
regulated, it seems appropriate that consent should be available in both
electronic and written format.
214. Id.
215. Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
115/14.5(2)(c) (2020) (governing employer’s payment of wages to employees and
deductions that an employer may take from an employees’ paycheck).
216. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/9 (2020).
217. Id.
218. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2020).
219. Defamation – Privacy, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-201 (2018).
220. See Blair v. Nev. Landing P’ship, 369 Ill. App. 3d 318 (2006) (finding
that a violation of the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1075/1
had a one-year limitation).
221. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202 (2020).
222. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2020).
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because it allows for a private civil right of action against entities
that violate BIPA.223
There have been many failed attempts to amend BIPA.224 For
example, there was a proposed amendment (“SB3053”) in the
Illinois senate, which would have limited BIPA by carving out
exceptions.225 Under the proposed exceptions, entities that do not
retain biometric data for more than 24 hours would be exempt from
BIPA requirements as would entities collecting biometric data for
employment purposes.226 Additionally, SB3053 sought to limit
the “biometric identifier[s]” and “biometric information” protected
under BIPA, which would exclude facial recognition.227 However,
SB3053 was too limiting, and failed just as similar bills have failed
in the past.228 In supporting an amendment like SB3053, it could be
argued that exempting employers from BIPA entities could have
promoted employers to implement advanced tracking systems to
reduce time theft.
In addition to the statutory ambiguities that Illinois courts
have not addressed, there are other provisions in BIPA that may be
litigated in future cases, as well. For example, in late 2019, an

223. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-205 (2020).
224. Lorenc, et al, supra note 40.
225. The Proposed Amendment to 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/25, S.B. 3053,
100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2018), states:
(f) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to apply to a private entity
collecting, storing, or transmitting biometric information if: (1) the
biometric information is used exclusively for: (A) employment, human
resources, compliance, identification, or authentication purposes; (B)
preventing or investigating acts of terrorism, human trafficking,
kidnapping, or violence; or (C) safety, security, or fraud prevention
purposes; (2) the private entity does not sell, lease, or trade the biometric
identifier or biometric information collected; and (3) the private entity
documents a process and time frame to delete any biometric information
used for the purposes identified in paragraph (1).
Id.

226. Id.
227. Jeffrey Neuburger, Illinois Considering Amendments to Biometric
Privacy Law (BIPA) That Would Create Major Exemptions to Its Scope,
PROSKAUER (Apr. 17, 2018), newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2018/04/17/illinoisconsidering-amendments-to-biometric-privacy-law-bipa-that-would-createmajor-exemptions-to-its-scope/.
228. See Amy Korte, A Proposed Amendment to The Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act That Would Exclude Facial-Recognition Technology
Used By Facebook From The Privacy Protections of The Act Has Been Postponed
After Privacy Advocates and The Illinois Attorney General Raised Concerns, ILL.
POL’Y (June 17, 2016), www.illinoispolicy.org/amendment-to-exclude-facebookfacial-recognition-technology-from-illinois-privacy-law-put-on-hold/ (reporting
that in 2016, the amendment was put on hold after privacy advocates and the
Illinois Attorney General expressed concern regarding the limitations in the bill
that would hinder claims against social media giants, like Facebook, for tag
suggestions). See also Wernick, supra note 8 (reporting that SB3053 failed to
pass into law).
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Illinois federal district court addressed a plaintiff’s claim that the
defendant failed to have a publicly available disclosure policy as
required by BIPA, and the court reviewed conduct that a plaintiff
must allege for a BIPA violation to qualify as reckless or intentional
intent.229
Interestingly, there has not been litigation regarding the BIPA
prohibition on selling or profiting from biometric information. BIPA
states, “No private entity in possession of a biometric identifier or
biometric information may sell, lease, trade, or otherwise profit
from a person’s or a customer's biometric identifier or biometric
information.”230 In comparison, other provisions in BIPA allow an
entity to take certain actions, so long as the entity obtains consent—
among other requirements.231 However, the profit prohibition does
not outline any exceptions that allow an entity to sell information.
This is significant because data brokers, who collect and sell
personal information, represent a huge industry in the United
States.232 While the brokers’ data collection has, historically, not
ventured into selling biometric data, it is possible that it could as
technology continues to grow, which would in turn implicate
BIPA.233
There could be a new area of BIPA litigation if employees start
suing larger employers that use third parties to process and
maintain biometric data. BIPA requires employers to obtain
consent from an employee before disclosing a biometric identifier or
information to another entity.234 That regulation does not exempt
an employer that discloses the information to the company
facilitating the timecards, nor does it exempt the third party from
obtaining consent for its use of employees’ data.235 This is exactly
what happened in Dixon: the employer and third party timekeeping
company violated BIPA because the employee never consented to
either biometric data collection by the employer or third party.236
The employee’s knowledge that her fingerprint was scanned did not
waive the BIPA requirement for consent to later disclose that
information.237 Based on Dixon, an employee and its third party
229. Rogers v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 3d 612, 617-18
(N.D. Ill. 2019).
230. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(c) (2020).
231. For examples of exceptions, see 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(1)-(3)
(2020), and 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(d)(1)-(4) (2020).
232. Michal Wlosik, What Is a Data Broker and How Does It Work?,
CLEARCODE, www.clearcode.cc/blog/what-is-data-broker/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2020) (estimating that data brokerage accounts for $200 billion in revenue
annually).
233. See id. (highlighting that data brokers collect personal information
using social media accounts, internet browser history, purchase history, credit
card information, and government records).
234. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(d) (2020).
235. Id.
236. Dixon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90344, at *10.
237. Id.
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vendor both need independent consent from the employee for the
disclosure and the storage.238

D. Employer Biometric Data Collection
Biometric timekeeping has become an increasingly popular
way to combat employee misconduct and errors, but the payroll
savings invites a risk for high damages.239 For example, a class
action BIPA suit was filed against Roundy’s Grocery, which
employed “more than 10,000 Illinois workers” in 2017.240 If 100% of
those employees joined the class action suit, then Roundy’s could be
liable for ten million dollars.241 Alternatively, a company facing a
BIPA suit may choose to settle, regardless of liability, to avoid
further legal fees. For example, L.A. Tan Enterprises settled for
$1.5 million to customers in a lawsuit after the company shared
fingerprint scans to an out-of-state vendor.242 This settlement shows
how costly BIPA litigation can be, as the settlement included the
$600,000 that it cost the plaintiff class in attorney fees.243
Conversely, employers that do not implement better
timekeeping risk employees “stealing” time under traditional
timekeeping methods.244 Hourly employees have a responsibility to
clock in and out of their shifts and a duty to accurately report.245
According to American Payroll Association, “buddy clocking”246
affects 75% of businesses and the average employee steals 4.5 hours
through general “time theft.”247 Time theft includes timesheet
fraud, rounding up hours, “buddy clocking,” unauthorized paid
breaks, and not working while clocked in.248 A recent survey given
to hourly employees concluded that 16 percent of the employees

238. See id. at *33 (denying the third-party vendor’s request to be dismissed
from the BIPA suit).
239. Christopher G. Ward, Using Biometric Timekeeping? Be Aware of
Potential Compliance Risks, FOLER & LARDNER LLP (Oct. 23, 2017), www.
foley.com/en/insights/publications/2017/10/using-biometric-timekeeping-beaware-of-potential.
240. Yerak, supra note 32.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Michael J. Bologna, Biometric Workplace Privacy Suits Erupt in Illinois
State Court, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 25, 2017), news.bloomberglaw.com/dailylabor-report/biometric-workplace-privacy-suits-erupt-in-illinois-state-court.
244. Ashik Ahmed, How To Insure Against Time Theft, FORBES (Jan. 19,
2018),
www.forbes.com/sites/ashikahmed/2018/01/19/how-to-insure-againsttime-theft/#55dcc0c15ac8.
245. Ward, supra note 239.
246. Id. (explaining that Buddy Clocking occurs when an employee signs for
another employee such as an employee that clocks-in for their co-worker who is
running late).
247. Id.
248. Id.
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admitted to clocking-in for a co-worker.249 The survey also found the
most common error employees made in timesheet submissions was
adding an extra 15 minutes.250 Based on this survey251 and the
estimated 78.2 million hourly workers,252 U.S. employers lose a total
of $373 million annually due to “buddy clocking.”253

E. Alternative Forms of Relief for Employees
With increasing BIPA litigation, employees may rebel against
biometric timekeeping and risk losing their employment when they
refuse to relinquish their biometric data. If such an event happens,
employees may be able to sue for retaliatory discharge.254 However,
Illinois narrowly interprets the tort of retaliatory discharge.255 In
Illinois, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the employee was
discharged; (2) the discharge was in retaliation to the employee’s
activities; and (3) the discharge “violates a clear mandate of public
policy.”256
The main restriction in a retaliatory discharge claim is that
Illinois law has not defined what qualifies as a public policy
violation.257 Instead, the Illinois Courts have articulated that
retaliatory discharge “must strike at the heart of a [1]
citizen's social rights, [2] duties, and [3] responsibilities before the
tort will be allowed,” rather than a private grievance.258 The heart
of BIPA protects the privacy rights of citizens.259 There is no
249. What Is Buddy Punching And How To Prevent It, TSHEETS BY
QUICKBOOKS,
www.tsheets.com/resources/prevent-buddy-punching
(last
visited Feb. 8, 2020) (describing a data collection by TSheets commissioned
PollFish that surveyed 1,000 U.S. Workers that were at least 18 years old).
250. Id.
251. Id. (declaring that 16% of employees admitted to buddy clocking and
the most common error was adding 15 minutes a timesheet).
252. BLS, supra note 165 (basing its finding on hourly employees that
making an average hourly wage of $22.97).
253. The finding used the following equations: 16% of 78.2 million =
1,251,200 and 25% (15 minutes) of $22.57 (average hourly wage) = $5.74. Then,
$5.74 x 1,251,200 workers = $7,185,016 per week. Id. Therefore, the annual total
is $7,185,016 x 52 weeks = $373,458,176. Id.
254. Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 491-92 (Ill. 1998)
(holding that employee needed to show that he was discharged in retaliation to
his activities and the discharge violated public policy).
255. Id. at 492.
256. Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2009) (noting that retaliatory
discharge was first recognized in 1978 and it is an exception to the rule of an
“at-will” employee, who can normally be terminated at any time) (citing
Hinthorn v. Roland’s of Bloomington, Inc., 529 N.E.2d 909 (1988)).
257. See Trochuck v. Patterson Cos., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1150 (S.D. Ill.
2012) (holding that retaliatory discharge cannot be based on Illinois Wage
Payment and Collection Act because the policy reason was too vague).
258. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill.
1981) (alteration added).
259. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2020).

102

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:Article1stPg

recourse for an individual’s whose biologically-unique data has been
stolen, whereas there is recourse for victims of credit card or
identity theft.260 Thus, the court’s lack of a definition creates an
opportunity for Illinois to broaden its interpretation to include
privacy rights in one’s biometric data.
While Illinois has not defined a “mandated public policy,”
Illinois courts have narrowly recognized retaliatory discharge as
violating public policy in only two circumstances.261 The first is
when an employee asserts a “right to file a workers' compensation
claim” pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act.262 The second
instance includes an employee who is discharged for “whistle
blowing,”263 which refers to reporting an employer’s illegal activity
to law enforcement.264 In the vein of whistle blowing, retaliatory
discharge has been recognized when an employee refuses to violate
a statue such as refusing to commit perjury265 or reporting to safety
violations to a federal administrative agency.266 In interpreting of a
whistleblowing action, the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that employers should not force their employees into violating
laws, which could subject the employee to liability.267 While it does
not seem like an employee could be subject to liability under BIPA,
an employer is effectively trying to get an employee to help the
employer evade the law by forgoing the requirements of BIPA.
Some employees have other reasons for withholding their
biometric data from employers, which may be subject to protection
in alternative causes of action.268 For instance, a mining worker in
West Virginia refused to comply with his employer’s fingerprint
collection because compliance would violate his religious beliefs by
giving him the “mark of the beast.”269 Subsequently, the worker was
forced to quit because he refused to comply and his employer would
not make accommodations.270 The trial court found that the worker
was discriminated against and constructively discharged.271
260. Id.
261. Dixon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90344, at *51.
262. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978) (holding,
as matter of policy, an employer should not have absolute power to terminate
an at-will employee).
263. Whistleblower Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/1 (2004).
264. Id.
265. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 879 (citing Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local 396, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184 (Cal. 1959)).
266. Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs., 451 F.3d 424, 447 (7th Cir. 2006).
267. Id. at 455.
268. See United States EEOC v. Consol Energy, Inc., No. 1:13CV215, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1326, at *2-3 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 7, 2015) (allowing a cause of
action under Title VII when an employer required its employees to use hand
scanners).
269. Id.
270. Id. at *3-4.
271. United States EEOC v. Consol Energy Inc., 860 F.3d 131, 137 (4th Cir.
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A similar case could easily arise in Illinois, but an employee
may have a better chance obtaining relief under the broader federal
statute against retaliatory discharge rather than Illinois’ narrow
interpretation of retaliatory discharge.272 There could also be relief
under a federal statute that protects employee organizations and
collective bargaining.273 If employees collectively combat BIPA,
either as a union or non-union group through a “concerted effort,”274
then they could qualify for protection under 29 U.S.C.S. § 157.275
For example, if an employee who refused to use the biometric
timekeeping because the employer was violating BIPA, then
solicited other employees to join in withholding their biometric data,
it could be considered a concerted effort.276 In that case, if the
employer terminates the employees for their collective effort, the
group of employees may be afforded protection because the bases for
termination could constitute an unfair labor practice.277 In light of
the broad definition of a concerted effort, which has grown with
technology, employees could be afforded protection under 29
U.S.C.S. § 157.

2016).
272. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(2018) (offering protection to employees who are members of protected classes).
273. 29 U.S.C.S. § 157 (2018), states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) [29 USCS 158(a)(3)].
Id.

274. An activity is concerted if it arises from prior group activity and an
employee acts on behalf of the groups or an employee contacts other employees
to join in the effort. Inova Health Sys. v. N.L.R.B., 795 F.3d 68, 74 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (first quoting Tradesmen Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1137, 1141 (D.C.
Cir. 2002), then quoting N.L.R.B. v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962))
(noting that other concerted activities may be protected under the National
Labor Relations Act “if they ‘relate to legitimate employee concerns about
employment-related matters’ to ‘protect[s] the right of workers to act together
to better their working conditions.’”).
275. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14-15.
276. Id. ; see also Three D, LLC v. N.L.R.B., 629 F. App'x 33, 37 (2d Cir.
2015) (highlighting that the definition of concerted has evolved with technology,
as an employee’s “like” on Facebook qualifies for protection because it seeks to
provide support for a group action).
277. See id. (holding that the employee’s social media activity supported the
group action complaining about tax liability due to their workplace. The
statements were not made to disparage the employer and the employer
discharged employees because of their Facebook activity which violated 29
U.S.C.S. § 157).
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F. The Impact of Biometric Data Breaches
The annual increase in identity theft resulting from data
breaches demonstrates how insurmountable a data breach of a
server housing biometric data could be to individuals.278 Illinois had
the seventh highest per capita rate of identity theft complaints in
2017 out of all the states.279 Additionally, almost 158 million Social
Security numbers and 14.2 million credit card numbers were
exposed in the United States in 2017 during data breaches.280
A newer scam targets W-2 records from employers through
“email phishing.”281 In this scheme, the scammer sends an email to
a member of the payroll department from an email address that
appears to be that of an existing executive of the company stating
that the email is a follow up to a W-2 records request which now
asks for a wire transfer.282 The scam has resulted in thousands of
dollars lost.283 In the same way that the W-2 forms were obtained,
cybercriminals could start requesting biometric data from the
employer while veiling themselves as the third-party vendor that
maintains the employer’s biometric data.
There is a myriad of offenses that cybercriminals could commit
with biometric data. A criminal could enter a secured building with
an employee’s biometric credentials.284 A criminal could expand the
use of “deepfake” technology from facial recognition to feign a video
of virtual anyone whose data the criminal can obtain.285 Considering
278. See 2017 Data Breaches, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR. 1, 3 (Jan. 22,
2018), www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2017Breaches/2017AnnualData
BreachYearEndReview.pdf (collecting data breaches annually, reflecting 1,579
breaches in 2017, a 44.7 percent increase from 2016).
279. Matt Tatham, Identity Theft Statistics, EXPERIAN (Mar. 15, 2018),
www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/identity-theft-statistics/ (describing that
cybercrimes have increased for all different types of employments and W-2
incident reports increased from 100 in 2016 to 900 in 2017).
280. Id.
281. Dangerous W-2 Phishing Scam Evolving; Targeting Schools,
Restaurants, Hospitals, Tribal Groups and Others, IRS (Feb. 2, 2017),
www.irs.gov/newsroom/dangerous-w-2-phishing-scam-evolving-targetingschools-restaurants-hospitals-tribal-groups-and-others (illustrating a new
scam wherein the cybercriminal sends an email to a payroll or human resources
personnel as though the email is from an executive, then requests a list of all
employees the W-2 forms).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Steve Symanovich, Biometric Data Breach: Database Exposes
Fingerprints, Facial Recognition Data Of 1 Million People, NORTON,
us.norton.com/internetsecurity-emerging-threats-biometric-data-breachdatabase-exposes-fingerprints-and-facial-recognition-data.html (last visited
Jan. 25, 2020).
285. See Donie O’Sullivan, When Seeing Is No Longer Believing - Inside The
Pentagon’s Race Against Deepfake Videos, CNN (Jan. 28, 2019),
www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/01/business/pentagons-race-against-deepfakes/.
A “Deepfake” is the use of artificial intelligence to create “convincing fake audio
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that individuals are now able to use their fingerprints to access
their cellphones and passwords, a criminal could gain access to an
individual’s personal messages, photos, and payment methods—
such as, bank accounts or credit cards—after accessing the
individual’s biometric data.286 Even further, this could impact
employers that give employees cellphones for work, if the phone
requires biometric data to access it. If the phone and biometric data
were obtained, it would grant the criminal access to an employer’s
sensitive business information.
These data breaches are already happening in the private
sector. In early August 2019, outside security researchers
discovered that Suprema’s internationally-utilized “Biostar 2”
security platform was breached.287 Among other data, the breach
notably included the fingerprint data of at least 1 million people.288
Biostar 2 is utilized in the United States and the company recently
announced its integration into a separate security system which is
used in 83 countries, by entities including governments and
banks.289 In its worst forms, these types of breaches can lead to
cyberwarfare.290
In considering the impact on employees and data breaches, it
is worth noting that BIPA does not apply to the government’s
biometric data collection.291 Despite the common misconception that
the government has better data protection mechanisms and
resources in place than the average company, hackers stole 5.6
million federal employee fingerprint records in 2015 alone.292 No
federal statute exists that addresses or regulates biometric

and video” that make a person “appear to say or do something” that has not
actually occurred in reality. Id. Typically, videos have been created from public
appearances by an individual and used for political purposes. Id.
286. See Are You One Of The Million People Whose Biometric Data Has Been
Exposed?, ENTERPRISE MGMT. 360 (Aug. 15, 2019), www.em360tech.com
/continuity/tech-news/opinion-piece/biometric-data/ (among other sensitive
information, a team was able to access “personal details, including employee
home addresses, emails and start dates” after a data breach).
287. Jon Porter, Huge Security Flaw Exposes Biometric Data Of More Than
A
Million
Users,
VERGE
(Aug.
14.
2019),
www.theverge.com
/2019/8/14/20805194/suprema-biostar-2-security-system-hack-breachbiometric-info-personal-data.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See Jeff Wichman, As Attacks On Biometric Data Rise, Risk And
Identity-Defined Security Become Paramount, INFO SECURITY (Sept. 24, 2019),
www.infosecurity-magazine.com/opinions/biometric-identity-risk/ (describing
“cyber ware” as one of the motives behind targeting biometric data: “For
individuals in government, law enforcement and the military, the impact of a
breach of this nature could be catastrophic – even life threatening.”).
291. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2020).
292. U.S. Government Hack Stole Fingerprints Of 5.6 Million Federal
Employees, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 23, 2015), www.theguardian.com
/technology/2015/sep/23/us-government-hack-stole-fingerprints.
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collection.293 With no federal protection, those 5.6 million employees
lack any fundamental recourse.294 Even if recourse was available, it
would probably not apply to government employees, only private
employees, as BIPA does not apply to government employers.295 A
federal statute would likely be the only way to protect individuals
biometric data from governmental entities.

G. Alternative Employer Approaches to BIPA Suits
Supermarket giant Roundy’s attempted to avoid liability for
BIPA violations when it argued that it only used “a portion of an
employee’s finger” rather than an entire fingerprint.296 Roundy’s
used Kronos for finger scanning technology to maintain biometric
timecards.297 Roundy’s reasoned “[i]t’s not possible to construct a
biometric identifier such as a fingerprint from the data,” so BIPA is
not implicated.298 In response to employee privacy concerns, Kronos
claims that it does not store photos of fingerprints, but rather
converts a fingerprint into a mathematical equation that cannot
recreate the fingerprint.299 Out-of-state defendants could pursue
the argument that subjecting them to BIPA regulations violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause because Illinois attempts to unduly
burden interstate commerce.300 Presently, BIPA has potential to
burden interstate commerce because the statute does not explicitly
state that the data collection must occur within Illinois.
Defendants could challenge class certification rather than
challenging standing upon removal to federal court. Plaintiffs bear
the burden to prove all four requirements for class certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”).301 Defendants
could spend more resources combating a class certification because
the plaintiff has the burden of proof at this stage in litigation.302
293. Kathi Walker, Biometric Authentication In The Workplace, NEW FOCUS
HR (July 9, 2018), www.newfocushr.com/2018/07/12/biometric-authenticationworkplace/.
294. U.S. Government Hack Stole Fingerprints of 5.6 Million Federal
Employees, supra note 292.
295. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2020). “A [p]rivate entity means any
individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or
other group, however organized. A private entity does not include a State or
local government agency.” Id.
296. Yerak, supra note 32.
297. Ease Employees’ Privacy Concerns About Kronos Biometric Technology,
KRONOS INC. 1 (2005), www.gc4me.com/information_technology/docs/
Fingerscan_privacy_concerns.pdf [hereinafter Ease Employees’ Privacy
Concerns].
298. Yerak, supra note 32.
299. Ease Employees’ Privacy Concerns About Kronos Biometric Technology,
supra note 297, at 2.
300. In re Facebook, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81044, at *13.
301. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012).
302. Rule 23 Class Actions, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4) (2018). The Rule
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Some BIPA defendants removed the suit to federal court under the
Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)303 but ended up back in state
court under a granted motion to remand.304 CAFA does not
explicitly state additional jurisdictional requirements must be met
to remove a case. However, federal courts have an independent
obligation to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.305 Some
district courts have even dismissed CAFA class actions for lack of
Article III Standing, but there is a trend to remand rather than
dismiss.306
Instead of removing a case, defendants could argue that the
class cannot be certified under Rule 23 because plaintiffs lack an
actual injury, thus failing commonality and typicality.307 Based on
Spokeo and the Seventh’s Circuit recent decision in Collier v. SP
Plus Corp., defendants could cite precedential cases from the forum
court that held bare procedural violations did not satisfy an
injury.308 Otherwise, BIPA defendants will be stuck in Illinois state
courts if defendants challenge Article III Standing.309 Additionally,
a defendant would save money because a court can award a plaintiff
costs and attorney fees if the plaintiff wins its motion to remand

states:
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
Id.

303. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (2011) (granting federal district courts
“original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a
class action in which . . . [a]ny member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a
State different from any defendant.”).
304. Barnes v. Aryzta, LLC, 288 F. Supp. 3d 834, 836 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20,
2017).
305. Id.
306. Matthew Mall, District Court: CAFA Class Actions Lacking Article III
Standing Must Be Remanded to State Court, Not Dismissed, AM. BAR ASS’N
(Oct. 27, 2016), www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/classactions/practice/2016/cafa-class-actions-lacking-article-iii-standing-must-beremanded-to-state-court/.
307. John E. Goodman, The Standing Trap: Will a Spokeo Challenge Lock a
Class Action Defendant into a State Court Forum?, BRADLEY ARANT BOULT
CUMMINGS
LLP
(May
29,
2018),
www.classactiondeclassified.com
/2018/05/standing-trap-will-spokeo-challenge-lock-class-action-defendantstate-court-forum/.
308. Collier, 889 F.3d at 895 (holding that the suit should have been
remanded rather than dismissed due to plaintiff’s lack of standing by only
showing a bare statutory violation).
309. Mall, supra note 306.

108

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:Article1stPg

after the defendant removed the case.310

IV. PROPOSAL
This proposal addresses various steps that could be taken in
state and federal legislatures, federal courts, and among employers.
As BIPA surpasses its tenth anniversary, it should continue to
remain in full force without diminishing any of its protections by
adopting legislative amendments. Illinois enacted BIPA at a time
where the progression of biometric data collection and technological
protections were unknown.311 The legislature even emphasized,
“[t]he full ramifications of biometric technology are not fully known”
when it enacted BIPA.312 There have been extensive technological
changes in the last decade; annual smartphones sales exploded from
$139 million in 2008 to $1.4 billion in 2016, and Facebook users
grew from 100 million in 2008 to 1.79 billion in 2016.313 In 2008,
there were no iPads, GPS on smart phones,314 ride-sharing apps,315
mobile payment services,316 4G networks, dating applications, or
music streaming applications.317 These products have become daily
essentials for many Americans and technology continues to grow.
Alongside these technological advancements, there have been
extensive data breaches in both the private and public sector.318 The
310. Mocek v. Allsaints USA Ltd., 220 F. Supp. 3d 910, 914 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7,
2016); § 1447(c).
311. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(d)-(f) (2020) (outlining that the legislature’s
intent for enacting BIPA was “an overwhelming majority of members of the
public are weary of the use of biometrics” and“[t]he full ramifications of
biometric technology are not fully known”).
312. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(f) (2020).
313. Jefferson Graham, 5 Top Ways Tech Has Changed Since 2008, USA
TODAY (Nov. 13, 2016), www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/11/13/5-top-waystech-has-changed-since-2008/93527624/.
314. Avery Hartmans, These 18 Incredible Products Didn't Exist 10 Years
Ago, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 23, 2018), www.businessinsider.com/18-tech-productsthat-didnt-exist-10-years-ago-2017-7 (providing an example that GPS was
invented in 1978 and available for commercial use in 1993 but it was not
available on cellphones until Apple introduced it in 2008).
315. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Uber's Biggest Rival Has Raised New Funding
And Doubled In Valuation To $15 billion, BUS. INSIDER (June 28, 2018),
www.businessinsider.com/lyft-doubled-valuation-15-billion-2018-6 (depicting
that Lyft launched in 2012, currently valued at $15.1 billion, and provided 375
million trips to passengers in 2017 meanwhile Uber launched in 2009, currently
valued at $62 billion and provided $4 billion trips in 2017).
316. Emmett Higdon, Mobile Online Retail Payments 2016, JAVELIN
STRATEGY & RES. (Oct. 6, 2016), www.javelinstrategy.com/coveragearea/mobile-online-retail-payments-2016 (finding that mobile retail payments
in the U.S. grew 60% from 2014 to 2015 ($180 billion) and are expected to reach
$320 billion by 2020).
317. Hartmans, supra note 314.
318. Porter, supra note 287; U.S. Government Hack Stole Fingerprints Of
5.6 Million Federal Employees, supra note 292.

2020]

Biometric Privacy

109

full ramifications of technology continue to remain unknown, which
is why protections like BIPA are imperative.
As it relates to the statute itself, any amendment that seeks to
limit BIPA should be rejected. Illinois should adopt a three-year
statute of limitations for BIPA injuries in line with a negligence
claim as the standard of care seems to boil down to “reasonable
care.” Employers should be required to disclose their intention to
collect data at the time the employer hires the employee in a
separate disclosure form rather than a clause embedded in an
employment agreement. Currently, BIPA does not define how the
written release is administered.319 The intent behind BIPA is
similar to an employer-sponsored employee benefits plan, which
also seeks to protect sensitive data.320 If BIPA followed the same
rationale as the Illinois wage statute, then employers should not be
able force employees into using their biometric data for
timekeeping, especially considering the employee is not receiving
any benefit. An employer cannot force employees to receive their
paychecks electronically via direct deposit.321
The doctrine of unconscionability under Illinois law should
apply to the consent requirement under BIPA.322 For example, the
consent provision should be easily viewable and understandable
under the circumstances at the time the document is signed.323 If
the provision is unconscionable, then it is unenforceable and a BIPA
violation would arise because consent is lacking. Adding the layer
of unconscionability would prompt the employer to be clear in its
disclosure.
While employers may not initially collect biometric data for
commercial purposes, agreeing to employment is different than
choosing a product, which collects biometric data. Further, data
breaches continue to become more prevalent among private
companies.324 “A person cannot obtain new DNA or new fingerprints
or new eyeballs for iris recognition . . . Replacing a biometric
identifier is not like replacing a lost key or a misplaced
identification card or a stolen access code.”325 Employees generally
do not have much bargaining power against an employer who wants
to collect their data. Employees should not have to choose between
earning a living and giving up their privacy rights. Further,
employers need more education on BIPA and its impact, which the
319. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2020).
320. 29 U.S.C. CH. 18 § 1001, et seq. (2019) (noting that an employer cannot
force an employee to receive the “employee benefits plan” documents via
electronic delivery unless the employee meets certain requirements).
321. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/1 (2020).
322. Cognitest Corp. v. Riverside Publ'g Co., 107 F.3d 493, 499 (7th Cir.
1997).
323. We Care Hair Dev., Inc. v. Engen, 180 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 1999).
324. Porter, supra note 287.
325. Sekura v. Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc., 115 N.E.3d 1080, 1093,
appeal denied, 119 N.E.3d 1034 (Ill. App. 1st 2019).
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Department of Labor should assist in implementing.
If the U.S. Supreme Court weighs in on the issue of Article III
Standing under BIPA, it would promote uniformity among the
circuits and deter forum shopping. The Supreme Court should find
that a technical violation is actionable due to the sensitive nature
of the data and potential of evolving technology, which can diminish
a person’s privacy rights. Disclosing biometric data without prior
consent to a third party should always qualify as a concrete injury
and even allow for higher damages.326 There must be safeguards to
protect sensitive data, which becomes more vulnerable as
technology progresses. Biometric privacy acts could affect interstate
commerce, if states continue to enact similar statues and those
states have different requirements. If the Supreme Court weighed
in on standing, it would allow other states to move forward with
enacting similar biometric privacy acts and harmonize varying
state interpretations. Although, this would not solve biometric
privacy issues and pitfalls, it would solidify the recognition of this
type of injury.
Congress could also enact a similar federal statute to regulate
biometric data collection, but it should not preempt state law.
Instead, it should establish a minimal baseline. It could be a matter
of national security if cybercriminals obtain a citizens’ DNA data.
Other states are planning to enact biometric privacy statutes, so
Congress may eventually need to take action to ensure uniformity,
especially because technology often crosses state lines.327 Any
statute that Congress enacts should include recourse in the event
that the entity violates a technical provision, such as notice and
consent, and allow a private right of action.
Other states should continue to enact biometric privacy
statutes. Like BIPA, those statutes must include a private right of
action. Biometric data privacy should be a nationally recognized
privacy right, similar to common law privacy claims that have been
long-held actionable by the courts.328

V. CONCLUSION
The growth of technology is inevitable – state and federal levels
of government should grow with it by protecting individuals’ privacy
rights, especially employees. Data breaches threaten national
security far beyond the borders of a state, as seen in recent years.329
326. See e.g., Dixon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90344, at *39 (employer
physically shipped hard drives with biometric data to its third-party vendor of
timecards without any protection).
327. See e.g., In re Facebook, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81044, at *12 (where
Facebook was sued by Illinois citizens for its use of facial recognition).
328. Patel, 932 F.3d at 1273; Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 983.
329. See U.S. Government Hack Stole Fingerprints Of 5.6 Million Federal
Employees, supra note 292 (revealing international hackers stole 5.6 million
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The recognition of data privacy rights requires accountability at
different government levels and among employers to ensure safety
for all employees. Employers need to be held accountable for
protecting their employees’ data, so they should not be treated
differently under a non-commercial entity exception.
BIPA remains the gold standard in the United States for
biometric data collection, despite the efforts to erode its protections.
Other states should continue to enact similar statutes and grant
individuals the private right to protect and adjudicate offenses
against their data. The Illinois legislature’s intent holds true: “[t]he
public welfare, security, and safety will be served by regulating the
collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and
destruction of biometric identifiers and information.”330 This
urgency only continues to grow as technology advances; the
recognition and protection of data privacy rights must growth with
it.

federal employee fingerprint records in 2015). See also Tatham, supra note 279
(estimating that 158 million Social Security numbers and 14 million credit card
numbers were exposed in the United States in 2017 during data breaches).
330. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(g) (2020).
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